Fix this by setting goproto_unrecognized_all=false which suppresses this field.
Upstream doesn't have the problem because they have pinned an older version
of gogo/protobuf: https://github.com/docker/libnetwork/pull/2242
Author: Felix Geyer <fgeyer@debian.org>
Gbp-Pq: Name libnetwork_proto_no_unrecognized_all.patch
```
00:38:11 === Failed
00:38:11 === FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
00:38:11 hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
00:38:11 hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
00:38:11
00:38:11 === FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
00:38:11 hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
00:38:11 hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 683766613a8c1dca8f95b19ddb7e083bb3aef266) Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Gbp-Pq: Name test--engine-fix-golang11.patch
After switching to Go 1.12, the format-string causes an error;
```
=== Errors
cli/config/config_test.go:154:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
cli/config/config_test.go:217:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
cli/config/config_test.go:253:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
cli/config/config_test.go:288:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
cli/config/config_test.go:435:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
cli/config/config_test.go:448:3: Fatalf format %q has arg config of wrong type *github.com/docker/cli/cli/config/configfile.ConfigFile
DONE 1115 tests, 2 skipped, 6 errors in 215.984s
make: *** [Makefile:22: test-coverage] Error 2
Exited with code 2
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit d4877fb2259feac2c76762ccd3001999cb7f0d58) Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Gbp-Pq: Name test--cli-fix-golang12.patch
For now, just verifying that an error is returned, but not checking the
error message itself, because those are not under our control, and may
change with different Go versions.
```
=== Failed
=== FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
=== FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Gbp-Pq: Name test--cli-fix-golang11.patch
Fix this by setting goproto_unrecognized_all=false which suppresses this field.
Upstream doesn't have the problem because they have pinned an older version
of gogo/protobuf: https://github.com/docker/libnetwork/pull/2242
Author: Felix Geyer <fgeyer@debian.org>
Gbp-Pq: Name libnetwork_proto_no_unrecognized_all.patch
Libnetwork should only use the iptables binary. Iptables v1.8 and above
uses the nftables backend. The translations for all the rules used by
libnetwork is supported by the new iptables binary.
DebugRequestMiddleware: unconditionally scrub data field
Commit 77b8465d7e68ca102d7aae839c7b3fe0ecd28398 added a secret update
endpoint to allow updating labels on existing secrets. However, when
implementing the endpoint, the DebugRequestMiddleware was not updated
to scrub the Data field (as is being done when creating a secret).
When updating a secret (to set labels), the Data field should be either
`nil` (not set), or contain the same value as the existing secret. In
situations where the Data field is set, and the `dockerd` daemon is
running with debugging enabled / log-level debug, the base64-encoded
value of the secret is printed to the daemon logs.
The docker cli does not have a `docker secret update` command, but
when using `docker stack deploy`, the docker cli sends the secret
data both when _creating_ a stack, and when _updating_ a stack, thus
leaking the secret data if the daemon runs with debug enabled:
6. Verify that the secret is scrubbed in the daemon logs
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.170617400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/create
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.171364900Z] form data: {"Data":"*****","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"}
7. Re-deploy the stack to trigger an "update"
docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test
8. Notice that this time, the Data field is not scrubbed, and the base64-encoded secret is logged
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.828819400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/w3hgvwpzl8yooq5ctnyp71v52/update?version=34
DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.829993700Z] form data: {"Data":"c2VjcmV0Cg==","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"}
This patch modifies `maskSecretKeys` to unconditionally scrub `Data` fields.
Currently, only the `secrets` and `configs` endpoints use a field with this
name, and no other POST API endpoints use a data field, so scrubbing this
field unconditionally will only scrub requests for those endpoints.
If a new endpoint is added in future where this field should not be scrubbed,
we can re-introduce more fine-grained (path-specific) handling.
This patch introduces some change in behavior:
- In addition to secrets, requests to create or update _configs_ will
now have their `Data` field scrubbed. Generally, the actual data should
not be interesting for debugging, so likely will not be problematic.
In addition, scrubbing this data for configs may actually be desirable,
because (even though they are not explicitely designed for this purpose)
configs may contain sensitive data (credentials inside a configuration
file, e.g.).
- Requests that send key/value pairs as a "map" and that contain a
key named "data", will see the value of that field scrubbed. This
means that (e.g.) setting a `label` named `data` on a config, will
scrub/mask the value of that label.
- Note that this is already the case for any label named `jointoken`,
`password`, `secret`, `signingcakey`, or `unlockkey`.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit c7ce4be93ae8edd2da62a588e01c67313a4aba0c) Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73db8c77bfb2d0cbdf71ce491f3d3e66c9dd5be6) Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Origin: upstream, https://github.com/docker/engine/pull/298
Gbp-Pq: Name cve-2019-13509-03-DebugRequestMiddleware-unconditionally-scrub-data-field.patch
Brian Goff [Thu, 30 May 2019 21:55:52 +0000 (14:55 -0700)]
Add chroot for tar packing operations
Previously only unpack operations were supported with chroot.
This adds chroot support for packing operations.
This prevents potential breakouts when copying data from a container.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Origin: upstream, https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/39292
Gbp-Pq: Name cve-2018-15664-02-add-chroot-for-tar-packing-operations.patch
Brian Goff [Thu, 30 May 2019 18:15:09 +0000 (11:15 -0700)]
Pass root to chroot to for chroot Untar
This is useful for preventing CVE-2018-15664 where a malicious container
process can take advantage of a race on symlink resolution/sanitization.
Before this change chrootarchive would chroot to the destination
directory which is attacker controlled. With this patch we always chroot
to the container's root which is not attacker controlled.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Origin: upstream, https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/39292
Gbp-Pq: Name cve-2018-15664-01-pass-root-to-chroot-to-for-chroot-untar.patch
[ Dmitry Smirnov ]
* rules: no longer disable Go cache to prevent FTBFS with Go 1.12.
[ Felix Geyer ]
* Cherry-pick upstream commits to fix test failures with golang >= 1.11.6-1+deb10u1
* Add upstream patch for CVE-2019-14271
* Fix build failure with gogo/protobuf >= 1.2
Libnetwork should only use the iptables binary. Iptables v1.8 and above
uses the nftables backend. The translations for all the rules used by
libnetwork is supported by the new iptables binary.
projects / docker.io.git / log